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Abstract: 
Do people have biased perceptions of their political orientation? Based on the link between 
political conservatism and in-group loyalty, we predicted that people would underestimate their 
liberalism and that this effect would be more pronounced among political conservatives. Young 
adults indicated their self-perceived political orientation and completed an objective measure of 
political orientation, which placed them along a liberal-conservative continuum by comparing 
their attitudes on 12 core issues (e.g., gay marriage, welfare) to population norms. Participants 
showed a significant bias toward perceiving themselves as more conservative than they actually 
were, and this effect was more pronounced among independents and conservatives than liberals. 
Further, biased self-perceptions of political orientation predicted voting behavior in the 2012 
Presidential Election after controlling for objective political orientation scores. Discussion 
highlights theoretical implications for self-knowledge research and practical implications for 
American politics more broadly. 
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Article: 
Self-knowledge is essential for the successful navigation of everyday life. Nonetheless, self-
perceptions of competence and personality are often inaccurate (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; 
Vazire & Carlson, 2011). For example, self-perceptions of performance show only moderate 
relations with objective performance measures including grades, supervisor evaluations, and 
teacher evaluations (Mabe & West, 1982; Zell & Krizan, 2013). Additionally, self-perceptions of 
personality (e.g., extraversion, conscientiousness) show only moderate relations with other 
ratings of personality (Kenny & West, 2010; Vazire & Carlson, 2010). These absences in self-
insight are partly attributed to informational processes; people sometimes lack sufficient 
feedback to judge themselves accurately (Caputo & Dunning, 2005). However, self-knowledge 
deficits can also arise from motivational processes; self-evaluation can be biased by a desire to 
view the self positively (e.g., Guenther & Alicke, 2010; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). 
Much progress has been made in advancing our understanding of self-knowledge (see Dunning, 
2005; Vazire & Wilson, 2012), but the present research goes beyond by identifying an untapped 
domain in the self-knowledge literature. Specifically, we examine whether people have biased 
perceptions of their political orientation. In countries where there are two-party political systems, 
people typically identify themselves as fitting within either the liberal or the conservative party 
(Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). But are people’s perceptions correct? Are people who identify 
as liberal really liberal? Are people who identify as conservative really conservative? These 
questions are of critical importance when considering that self-perceptions of political 
orientation strongly predict voting intentions and behavior (Jost, 2006). If people have biased 
perceptions of political orientation, they may vote for candidates who fail to support their views. 
To our knowledge, no research has directly examined self-insight of political orientation. 
However, emerging research suggests that people may be more liberal than they realize. First, 
whereas most Americans identify themselves as conservative, most Americans would be 
characterized as liberal by their attitudes on a variety of specific issues including poverty, 
education, and the environment (e.g., Free & Cantrill, 1967; Stimson, 2004). Similarly, although 
liberal policies such as health care reform often receive mixed reviews, people strongly support 
specific provisions of these policies when they are presented independently (e.g., allowing 
children to remain on their parent’s health care plan until the age of 25; Enten, 2012). Second, 
Americans tend to support greater distribution of wealth than is observed in American society, 
and mistakenly assume that financial resources are distributed more equitably than they actually 
are (Norton & Ariely, 2011). Third, although Americans have become increasingly liberal on 
several issues such as gay marriage, marijuana legalization, and immigration (Plaue, 2012), 
Americans have also become increasingly more likely to identify themselves as politically 
conservative (Florida, 2011). Despite these emerging findings, systematic studies have not 
examined whether people generally have biased perceptions of their political orientation, and 
whether such biases are stronger in some populations than others. 
Drawing upon research linking political conservatism with in-group loyalty (Graham et al., 
2013), we argue that underestimation of liberalism may be more prevalent among people who 
are relatively conservative. According to moral foundations theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007), 
liberals and conservatives have different sets of moral values. Whereas liberals can be 
characterized by concerns for harm and fairness, conservatives can be characterized by concerns 
for purity, obedience to authority, and in-group loyalty. More specifically, conservatives place 
higher value on loyalty to one’s family, country, religion, and ethnicity than do liberals (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). We propose that this desire for in-group loyalty might lead conservatives 
to self-identify more with the political in-group than liberals. As a result, people who are 
relatively conservative might label themselves as being more conservative than they actually are, 
as measured by their attitudes on specific political issues.1 
Furthermore, research suggests that political conservatism is associated with self-enhancement. 
In a sample of over 8,500 Internet respondents, self-rated conservatism was significantly 
associated with self-deceptive enhancement, that is, the tendency to have distorted self-
perceptions that are overly favorable in nature (Jost et al., 2010). Additionally, endorsement of 
fair market ideology, defined as the belief that market-based economies are fair and just, is 
significantly associated with both political conservatism and self-enhancement (Jost, Blount, 
Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003). Therefore, conservatives may not only place greater value on in-
group loyalty than liberals, but due to increased self-enhancement, they may also come to see 
themselves as more prototypical members of valued in-groups than liberals. For this reason, 
biases in self-perceptions of political orientation should be more pronounced among those who 
are relatively conservative. 
Three studies were conducted, two with college students and one with an Internet sample, to 
explore whether people underestimate their liberalism. In each study, participants provided self-
perceptions of political orientation and completed an objective assessment of political 
orientation, which compared participant’s attitudes on 12 core issues to population norms. A bias 
was predicted, such that self-perceptions of political orientation would be more conservative than 
objective political orientation scores derived from participant’s attitudes on specific issues. 
Further, it was anticipated that biases in self-perceptions of political orientation would be more 
pronounced among people who identified themselves as politically conservative as opposed to 
liberal. 
Study 1 
College students indicated their self-perceived political orientation and completed an objective 
measure of political orientation. These measures were compared to explore whether self-
perceptions of political orientation were significantly biased. Consistent with past research, we 
presumed that young adults would more often identify with the Democratic than Republican 
Party (Gallup, 2012). Unique to the current context, we also anticipated a self-perception bias 
whereby college students would think that they were more conservative (less liberal) than they 
actually were and that this effect would be more pronounced among students who were relatively 
conservative. 
Method 
One hundred ninety-nine college students at a university in the Southeastern United States 
completed the study for course credit (138 female, 55% Caucasian, 25% African American, M 
age = 20.34). It was emphasized throughout that questionnaire responses were completely 
anonymous and students completed study measures in private booths. First, students were asked 
to indicate which of seven categories they thought best matched their political views (see Table 
1). The following categories were presented from left to right: Liberal Democrat (1), Average 
Democrat (2), Moderate Democrat (3), Independent (4), Moderate Republican (5), Average 
Republican (6), and Conservative Republican (7). 
Table 1. Distribution of Self-Perceived and Actual Political Orientation. 
Political Party  Self-Perceived (%)  Actual (%) 
Study 1 
Liberal Democrat  13.1  39.2 
Average Democrat  25.6  12.6 
Moderate Democrat  11.6  17.6 
Independent  28.1  14.6 
Moderate Republican  12.6  10.1 
Average Republican  6.0  4.0 
Conservative Republican  3.0  2.0 
Study 2 
Liberal Democrat  27.8  63.3 
Average Democrat  15.6  10.8 
Moderate Democrat  15.8  7.8 
Independent  28.3  8.1 
Moderate Republican  7.8  3.9 
Average Republican  3.6 3 .6 
Conservative Republican  1.1  2.5 
Study 3 
Liberal Democrat  14.3  30.5 
Average Democrat  14.3  13.0 
Moderate Democrat  14.3  14.9 
Independent  14.3  13.6 
Moderate Republican  14.3  11.7 
Average Republican  14.3  6.5 
Conservative Republican  14.3  9.7 
 
Next, participants completed a political attitudes quiz created by the Pew Research Center (PBS 
Newshour, 2012). This instrument had participants indicate their agreement with 12 attitude 
statements on core issues in American politics (e.g., gay marriage, welfare; α = .68). The 
questionnaire had been previously administered to a representative sample of Americans to 
develop a weighting scheme that places respondents into one of the seven political categories 
listed above. The weighting scheme estimates the degree to which participant’s responses match 
those who are typical of each group and places them into a category of best fit (Pew Research 
Center, 2012). Objective political orientation scores were coded using the same scheme we 
utilized to code self-reported political orientation. Additional details on the political party quiz 
and scoring procedures are presented in the Appendix. 
Results 
There were no significant differences in self-perception bias as a function of age, gender, or race. 
Across the entire sample, self-perceptions of political orientation were significantly correlated 
with objective scores (r = .57, p < .001). As anticipated, however, self-ratings of political 
orientation (M = 3.32, SD = 1.58) were significantly more conservative than objective political 
orientation scores generated by the Pew quiz (M = 2.64, SD = 1.68), t(198) = 6.40, p < .001, d = 
0.42. 
Subsequent analyses tested whether this self-perception bias was moderated by political 
ideology. Underestimation of liberalism was indexed by subtracting objective political 
orientation from self-perceived political orientation for each subject, with higher values 
indicating greater underestimation of liberalism (see Figure 1). Moderate, Average, and 
Conservative Republicans were combined in this analysis to maintain adequate sample size. 
Liberal Democrats significantly overestimated their liberalism (t = 2.60, p = .02, d = 0.51), and 
Average Democrats had relatively unbiased self-perceptions (t = 0.48, p = .64, d = 0.07). 
However, Moderate Democrats (t = 4.00, p = .001, d = 0.83), Independents (t = 5.34, p < .001, d 
= 0.71), and Republicans (t = 5.71, p < .001, d = 0.87) significantly underestimated their 
liberalism. These results suggest that underestimation of liberalism observed in the present study 
was driven largely by students who were relatively conservative. 
 
Figure 1. Mean difference between self-perceptions and objective scores as a function of 
political identity (Study 1). Higher values indicate greater underestimation of liberalism. Error 
bars are ±1 standard error (SE). 
A regression analysis was conducted to further explore whether political ideology moderated 
underestimation of liberalism. In preparation for analysis, self-perceived political orientation was 
coded as follows: 1 = Liberal Democrat, 2 = Average Democrat, 3 = Moderate Democrat, 4 = 
Independent, 5 = Republican. As anticipated, underestimation of liberalism was more 
pronounced among students who identified themselves as relatively high than low in political 
conservatism, B = .46, SEB = .07, p < .001. 
Study 2 
Study 1 provided evidence suggesting that young adults underestimate their liberalism, 
especially moderate and conservative young adults. However, the Study 1 sample consisted of 
college students at a single university. It is possible that the obtained findings were specific to 
the cultural climate of this university or the Southeastern United States. Therefore, Study 2 
obtained a broader Internet sample to explore whether the Study 1 findings would replicate 
among a geographically diverse sample of young adults. 
Method 
An Internet survey was deployed using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011) on Wednesday September 12, 2012. The total sample included 360 respondents 
(233 female, 74% Caucasian, M age = 28.46). All participants were current residents of the 
United States, and respondents from 44 states were represented in the survey. Twenty-three 
participants were born outside the United States, but excluding these responses did not affect the 
observed pattern of results so they were retained. 
As in Study 1, participants indicated their self-perceived political orientation and completed the 
12-item objective measure of political orientation (α = .79; see Table 1). The order of the 
political orientation measures (self-perceived vs. objective) was counterbalanced and subsequent 
analyses showed no effect of order on self-perception bias. Additionally, participants were asked 
to report their highest level of educational obtainment and household income to explore whether 
these demographic variables moderated the predicted effects. 
Results 
There were no significant differences in self-perception bias as a function of age, gender, race, 
income, level of education, or region of residence (i.e., Northeast, South, Midwest, and West). 
Self-perceived and objective political orientation scores were significantly correlated (r = .55, p 
< .001). However, self-rated political orientation (M = 2.88, SD = 1.54) was significantly more 
conservative than objective political orientation (M = 1.99, SD = 1.61), t(359) = 11.34, p < .001, 
d = 0.55, thus replicating the effect obtained in Study 1. 
Furthermore, self-perception bias was once again moderated by political ideology (see Figure 2). 
Although Liberal Democrats (t = 2.61, p = .01, d = 0.26) significantly overestimated their 
liberalism, Average Democrats (t = 5.69, p < .01, d = 0.76), Moderate Democrats (t = 9.47, p < 
.001, d = 1.25), Independents (t = 9.12, p < .001, d = 0.90), and Republicans (t = 5.16, p < .001, d 
= 0.77) significantly underestimated their liberalism. Additionally, results of a regression 
analysis showed that underestimation of liberalism was more pronounced among participants 
who identified themselves as relatively high than low in political conservatism, B = .48, SEB = 
.05, p < .001. 
 
Figure 2. Mean difference between self-perceptions and objective scores as a function of 
political identity (Study 2). 
Consistent with predictions, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that young adults underestimate their 
liberalism and that this effect is stronger among those who are relatively conservative. However, 
as is common in young adult populations (Gallup, 2012), the samples in these studies were 
mostly Democratic, with only a minority of participants identifying themselves as Republican. 
Thus, it remains less clear whether Republicans generally underestimate their liberalism and 
whether underestimation of liberalism obtains among Moderate, Average, and Conservative 
Republicans as separate groups. To address this concern, Study 3 obtained an equal number of 
participants within each of the seven political categories. This balanced design allowed us to 
explore whether underestimation of liberalism obtains across the entire range of the political 
spectrum. 
Additionally, Study 3 explored whether biased self-perceptions of political orientation affected 
voting behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Past research suggests that single-item 
measures of political orientation predict voting intentions and behavior (Jost, 2006). Going 
further, we examined whether self-rated political orientation predicts voting even after 
controlling for political orientation scores derived from a more objective process. If obtained, 
this finding would provide preliminary evidence suggesting that biased perceptions of political 
orientation contaminate voting behavior. 
Method 
Data were collected from college students at a Southeastern and Mid-Atlantic university in the 
United States during January 2013. There were no significant differences in results across the 
two universities, so we collapsed across this factor. Screening was used to recruit an equal 
number of participants in each of the seven political categories. This resulted in a total sample of 
154 participants (110 female, 66% Caucasian, 22% African American, M age = 20.31), with 22 
participants in each political category (see Table 1). As in the prior studies, participants indicated 
their self-perceived political orientation and completed the 12-item objective measure of political 
orientation (α = .75). Participants also indicated whether they voted for Barrack Obama, Mitt 
Romney, another candidate, or did not vote during the 2012 Presidential election. 
Results 
There were no significant differences by age, gender, or race. Self-perceptions of political 
orientation were strongly correlated with objective scores (r = .76, p < .001). However, 
consistent with Studies 1 and 2, self-rated political orientation (M = 4.00, SD = 2.01) was 
significantly more conservative than objective political orientation scores (M = 3.21, SD = 2.02), 
t(153) = 7.01, p < .001, d = 0.49. 
Further, results of a linear regression analysis showed that underestimation of liberalism was 
more pronounced among students who identified themselves as relatively high than low in 
political conservatism, B = .23, SEB = .05, p < .001 (see Figure 3). Specifically, Liberal 
Democrats (t = 1.67, p = .11, d = 0.36), Average Democrats (t = 2.01, p = .06, d = 0.43), and 
Moderate Democrats (t = 1.64, p = .12, d = 0.35) were not significantly biased. However, 
Independents (t = 3.66, p = .001, d = 0.78), Moderate Republicans (t = 6.13, p < .001, d = 1.31), 
Average Republicans (t = 2.71, p = .01, d = 0.58), and Conservative Republicans (t = 3.93, p = 
.001, d = 0.84) significantly underestimated their liberalism. Aggregating across the three 
Democratic (n = 66) and Republican (n = 66) groups, Democrats (M = 0.18, SD = 1.63) showed 
significantly less bias in self-perceptions than Republicans (M = 1.24, SD = 1.43), t = 4.89, p < 
.001, d = 0.69.2 
 
Figure 3. Mean difference between self-perceptions and objective scores as a function of 
political identity (Study 3). 
Finally, in a logistic regression analysis, we predicted voting from self-perceived and objective 
political orientation. Voting for Obama and Romney were analyzed separately by creating 
dummy-coded variables that categorized voting for the target candidate as 1, and voting for the 
other candidate, a third party, or not voting as 0. Both self-reported (B = −.65, SEB = .16, p < 
.001) and objective political orientation (B = −.38, SEB = .16, p = .02) significantly predicted 
voting for Obama. Similarly, both self-reported (B = .81, SEB = .24, p = .001) and objective 
political orientation (B = .61, SEB = .20, p = .002) significantly predicted voting for Romney. 
Thus, self-perceptions of political orientation, which contain a significant degree of bias, predict 
voting behavior even after controlling for political orientation scores derived from a more 
objective process.3 
Discussion 
Three studies examined whether people have biased perceptions of their political orientation. It 
was anticipated that people would underestimate their liberalism and that this effect would be 
more pronounced among conservative than liberal respondents. Obtained results were consistent 
with these hypotheses. That is, self-reported political orientation was significantly more 
conservative than political orientation scores assigned to subjects using a more objective process. 
Furthermore, underestimation of liberalism was consistently larger among participants who were 
relatively conservative than liberal. Finally, biased self-perceptions predicted voting behavior in 
the 2012 Presidential Election even after controlling for objective political orientation scores. 
Previous research indicates that self-evaluations of competence and personality are susceptible to 
various biases (Dunning et al., 2004; Vazire & Carlson, 2011). In each of the studies reported 
here, self-evaluations of political orientation and objective political orientation scores were 
substantially correlated, suggesting that people have relatively accurate perceptions of their 
political orientation. However, mean-difference analyses demonstrated a systematic bias toward 
underestimation of liberalism. Further, because conservatives evidence higher levels of in-group 
loyalty and self-enhancement than liberals (Graham et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2010), we presumed 
that conservatives might identify more strongly with political in-groups, and come to see 
themselves as more prototypical members of such groups than liberals. Consistent with this 
perspective, underestimation of liberalism was more pronounced among participants who were 
relatively conservative. Thus, relevant motives may lead people to perceive themselves in an 
overly conservative manner much as they lead people to perceive themselves in an overly 
favorable manner (Guenther & Alicke, 2010; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). 
Beyond these basic contributions to self-knowledge research, our findings also have practical 
implications for the political process. Self-perceptions of political orientation strongly predict 
support for Presidential candidates who have the same orientation (Jost, 2006). However, 
underestimation of liberalism may lead some young adults to mistakenly vote for candidates who 
contradict their political views. Furthermore, during voter registration, most states require 
residents to identify themselves as Democratic, Republican, or Independent. This selection 
determines whether residents vote in the Democratic or Republican primary election. Our 
findings suggest that self-perceptions of political affiliation may be significantly biased, leading 
young adults to potentially place themselves into primary elections for which they are ill 
matched. 
In addition, our findings have implications for the measurement of political orientation. Research 
typically uses a single-item, explicit measure of political party identification (e.g., Jost, 2006; 
Stimson, 2004). While we might not suggest eliminating this valuable tool for measuring 
political affiliation, the current findings suggest that biases may contaminate such judgments. It 
is advised that future research use more objective measures of political orientation to cluster 
respondents into groups. The political party quiz used in the present report represents a 
convenient, low-resource alternative to explicit ratings of political party. Reaction time (Hawkins 
& Nosek, 2012) and neurocognitive measures of liberalism/conservatism (Amodio, Jost, Master, 
& Yee, 2007) may also represent fruitful but less convenient alternatives to explicit measures. 
A limitation of the present research was the use of nonrepresentative samples of college students 
and Internet respondents. Nonetheless, the present findings are consistent with results obtained 
from representative samples showing that self-perceptions of political identity often conflict with 
people’s attitudes on specific issues (Free & Cantrill, 1967; Stimson, 2004). Further, our results 
show that young adults underestimate how liberal their political attitudes are relative to the 
political attitudes of the general population. Because young adults comprise a significant portion 
of the general population, there must be another group that, as compensation, overestimates their 
liberalism. One possibility is that age moderates biases in self-perceptions of political 
orientation. Indeed, there are pronounced generational changes in people’s views on several 
political issues, such as gay marriage and immigration (Pew Research Center, 2011). Young 
adults who consider themselves conservative might espouse relatively liberal attitudes on issues 
in which there are generational changes (i.e., support gay marriage and immigration). 
Alternatively, older adults who consider themselves liberal might espouse relatively conservative 
attitudes on issues in which there are generational changes (i.e., oppose gay marriage and 
immigration). Therefore, whereas young adults underestimate their liberalism, older adults might 
overestimate their liberalism. Future research is needed to directly test this possibility. 
Another limitation of the current study was that we categorized self-perceived and objective 
political orientation along a left–right continuum ranging from Liberal Democrat to Conservative 
Republican, but some people’s political attitudes cannot be captured by this continuum. For 
example, some people consider themselves economic conservatives but social liberals (e.g., 
Libertarians), whereas others consider themselves social conservatives but economic liberals. 
Although refinement is needed to better account for the diversity of political views present in 
American society, the majority of the American public readily places themselves along the 
traditional left–right continuum (see Jost, 2006; Stimson, 2004). Additionally, social and 
economic attitudes are significantly correlated (Jost et al., 2009). Thus, underestimation of 
liberalism likely occurs for both social and economic attitudes, but future study is needed to 
directly test this possibility. 
Finally, we argue that in-group loyalty leads people to underestimate their liberalism. An 
alternative explanation for our findings is that young adults may evaluate their political 
orientation by focusing on how liberal they are in comparison to other young people they know 
and interact with on a regular basis. Because most young adults are relatively liberal, this may 
lead them to underestimate how liberal they are in comparison to the general population. 
However, findings obtained in the present studies are inconsistent with this hypothesis. If 
comparisons with liberal reference groups produced underestimation of liberalism, one would 
expect the effect to be constant across the political spectrum. By contrast, underestimation of 
liberalism was larger among conservatives than liberals, and staunch liberals typically 
overestimated their liberalism. Thus, our findings are better explained by moral foundations 
theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007), which predicts underestimation of liberalism should be more 
pronounced for those on the political right than left. 
In sum, the present research identified a systematic bias among young adults to perceive 
themselves as somewhat more conservative than they actually are. Future studies are needed to 
further explore when and why people underestimate their liberalism in addition to the 
implications of these findings for voting behavior and political discourse in America more 
generally. Based on self-reports of political orientation, commentators have presumed that 
America is a “center-right” nation (see Klein, 2010). The present findings challenge this 
assumption and signal a call for additional research exploring the validity of self-perceptions in 
the political realm. 
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Appendix 
The Political Party Quiz 
The specific statements used in the political party quiz were the following: (1) There need to be 
stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment; (2) The government should help more 
needy people even if it means going deeper into debt; (3) The growing number of newcomers 
from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values; (4) I never doubt the 
existence of God; (5) Business corporations make too much profit; (6) Gays and lesbians should 
be allowed to marry legally; (7) The government needs to do more to make health care 
affordable and accessible; (8) One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together; (9) 
Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good; (10) Abortion should be 
illegal in all or most cases; (11) Labor unions are necessary to protect the working person; (12) 
Poor people have become too dependent on government assistance programs. Responses were 
made on a 4-point scale with the following anchors: completely agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, and completely disagree. Agreement with Items 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11 were 
coded as liberal responses; agreement with Items 3, 4, 9, 10, and 12 were coded as conservative 
responses. 
Responses to each question were coded from −2 (most liberal position) to +2 (most conservative 
position). Then, responses were weighted by the correlation of the item with political party 
identification, derived from a representative sample of registered American voters (see Pew 
Research Center, 2012). The coefficients were as follows: Item 1 = .56, Item 2 = .51, Item 3 = 
.26, Item 4 = .24, Item 5 = .32, Item 6 = .43, Item 7 = .47, Item 8 = .28, Item 9 = .45, Item 10 = 
.45, Item 11 = .46, and Item 12 = .47. Weighted values were summed across the 12 items. 
Summed values were centered on the score of the average registered voter. Because the 
theoretical range of the scale is much wider than the actual distribution of the American public, 
extreme scores were compressed using a logarithmic function. 
Cutoff points were determined using average scores derived from the representative sample. The 
average score for each political group in the representative sample was as follows: Liberal 
Democrat = −4.05, Average Democrat = −2.75, Moderate Democrat = −1.80, Independent = 
0.09, Moderate Republican = 1.12, Average Republican = 3.29, and Conservative Republican = 
4.11. Participants were placed into the political category whose mean score was closest in value 
to their overall score on the quiz. Summary scores below −3.40 were coded as Liberal Democrat. 
Scores between −2.30 and −3.40 were coded as Average Democrat. Scores between −2.30 and 
−0.86 were coded as Moderate Democrat. Scores between −0.86 and 0.61 were coded as 
Independent. Scores between 0.61 and 2.21 were coded as Moderate Republican. Scores between 
2.21 and 3.70 were coded as Average Republican. Finally, scores above 3.70 were coded as 
Conservative Republican. 
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Notes 
1 Desires for in-group loyalty may also influence political attitudes (Cohen, 2003). However, 
specific attitudes within major political parties can be highly variable, ambiguous, and subject to 
change over time. For this reason, desires for in-group loyalty should have a greater influence on 
general perceptions of political identity than specific political attitudes. 
2 The critical outcome variable subtracted objective scores from self-perceptions. Using this 
approach, conservatives were more likely than liberals to underestimate their liberalism because 
conservative responses occupied higher values on response scales. To address this concern, we 
conducted supplemental analyses where self-perception bias was defined by the absolute 
difference between self-perceptions and objective scores. Consistent with our primary analyses, 
the absolute difference was significantly different from 0 in Study 1 (M = 1.24, SD = 1.27, t = 
16.30, p < .001), Study 2 (M = 1.24, SD = 1.20, t = 19.61, p < .001), and Study 3 (M = 1.16, SD 
= 1.09, t = 13.19, p < .001), suggesting that participants had biased self-perceptions of political 
orientation. Further, linear regression analyses showed that the absolute difference between self-
perceptions and objective scores was significantly larger among conservative than liberal 
respondents in Study 1 (B = .24, SEB = .05, p < .001), Study 2 (B = .44, SEB = .03, p < .001), 
and Study 3 (B = .15, SEB = .04, p = .001). Therefore, findings obtained in the primary analyses 
are not simply an artifact of the metric used to calculate self-perception bias, as they replicated 
even when bias was measured using absolute difference scores. 
3 There were no participants in Study 3 who identified themselves as Democratic when their 
objective scores suggested they were Republican. However, there were 19 participants who 
identified themselves as Republican when their objective scores suggested they were 
Democratic. Of these participants, six voted for Obama, five for Romney, one for another 
candidate, and seven did not vote. These findings must be interpreted with caution due to low 
sample size, but they suggest that people who misclassify themselves as Republican may on 
occasion vote for a Republican candidate when their views actually align more closely with the 
Democratic Party. 
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